

## Generation Line-Tap Connection Impact on Transmission Ground Fault Protection

Sarat Chandra Vegunta, Siemens PTI



Unrestricted | © Siemens 2024 | Sarat Chandra Vegunta | SI GSW PTI US&MX | 2024-03-25

### **Background and Context**

- Transmission interconnection requests for solar generation in the US have been steadily rising
- For small, solar systems near the existing transmission lines interconnecting via a line-tap is a normal practice
- Interconnecting generation systems via a line-tap pose several challenges to existing utility protection systems
- Lack of consistent application of negative-seq. current requirements from Inverter-based-Resources (IBRs) for ground fault detection and protection
- A US case study of solar plant that interconnects with an existing transmission line via a line-tap
- Challenges, lessons learned, and potential solutions to address above challenges are discussed in the paper

#### US Annual Electricity Gen. Capacity in GW (2018–2025)



### **Protection Challenges**

- Weak transmission grids pose protection challenges for generation systems interconnected via line-taps
- Line-tap connections can reduce line-end zero-sequence current contribution, affecting ground overcurrent relay sensitivity
- Changes in transmission line apparent impedances can lead to relay zone overreach issues
- Transmission system owners may stipulate costly threebreaker-ring connections to mitigate these challenges



### **Study Project – Overview**



Project single-line diagram

- 24 MW solar farm:116x210 kVA, 630 V PV IBRs
- Solar plant max. short-circuit current contribution was approx. 110% of the nominal current value
- 115 kV OHL Line-AB (82.7 km) tapped at LT-2 for the proposed solar site
- Relays R-A and R-B protect Line-AB and other tapped interconnections
- Upon R-A or R-B activation, a Direct Transfer Trip (DTT) signal is sent to solar plant to trip the site
- Station-A is a weak source of SLG fault current

### **Study Project – Challenges**

- Station-A is a weak source of SLG fault current
- Solar site MPT's 115 kV solidly-grounded Y-side is expected to provide current infeed, affecting the apparent impedance of the ground distance protection relays R-A and R-B
- With solar interconnection, relay R-A has a diminished ability to reliably detect ground faults:
  - ISO requires the relay R-A to see at least twice (160 A) the relay's minimum pickup value (80 A)
  - Variation in ground distance relay-related impedances
- Solar IBRs, combined with their Dy transformers, during fault conditions, are not a continuous source of significant zero-seq. or negative-seq. currents—site is unable to detect SLGs on the Line-AB



### **Study Project – Methodology**

- ISO's ASPEN short-circuit Base Case transmission system models, with the solar site plant, were obtained, reviewed, and used
- Reviewed ISO's 2019, 2022, and 2027 base cases, comparing the short-circuit levels near project areas
- Studies focused on classical, bolted SLG faults and related impacts
- Simulated potential Station-A short-circuit contributions for SLG faults at Station-B in pre- and post-project scenarios
- For post-project scenario, studies evaluated the impact of impedance grounding of the MPT 115 kV Y-side for various NGR sizes



### Study Project – Methodology (Cont'd.)

- Calculated apparent impedances of relay R-A for SLG faults at Station-B and analyzed ground distance relay responses
- Investigated the potential impact of continuous negativesequence short-circuit currents from solar inverters in various ISO base cases
- Conducted simulations for different slopes of positive- and negative-sequence dynamic reactive currents and analyzed obtained results



### **Review of ISO Base Cases' Short-Circuit Levels**

- Short-circuit analysis of the ISO's 2019, 2022, and 2027 bases cases was performed
- Two scenarios, pre-project (before project connection) and post-project (with the project connected to the model), were considered
- Bolted three-phase-to-ground (3LG), two-phase-toground (2LG) and SLG faults were applied at nine principal nodes in the vicinity of the project location
- Short-circuit contributions at the selected principal nodes, for the considered fault types, were generally higher than those short-circuit contributions in the ISO 2019 Base Case than for other cases

#### Short-Circuit Levels (SCLS) Between ISO Base Cases

ISO Base Case		Pre	-project	SC	Post-project SC			
	Nodes		Levels		Levels			
		3LG	2LG	1LG	3LG	2LG	1LG	
crease 19 BC	Node 1	18%	18%	6%	18%	16%	8%	
	Node 2	6%	9%	21%	6%	9%	20%	
	Node 3	5%	8%	21%	5%	8%	20%	
- i 20	Node 4	5%	8%	21%	5%	8%	20%	
2022 BC SCL against the	Node 5	6%	9%	21%	6%	9%	20%	
	Node 6	6%	9%	21%	6%	8%	20%	
	Node 7	-5%	-4%	-4%	-5%	-4%	-4%	
	Node 8	8%	6%	6%	7%	6%	6%	
	Node 9	7%	6%	6%	7%	6%	6%	
2027 BC SCL increase against the 2019 BC	Node 1	9%	9%	3%	9%	8%	4%	
	Node 2	8%	11%	24%	8%	11%	24%	
	Node 3	8%	11%	24%	8%	11%	24%	
	Node 4	8%	11%	24%	8%	11%	24%	
	Node 5	8%	11%	24%	8%	11%	24%	
	Node 6	8%	11%	24%	8%	11%	24%	
	Node 7	-5%	-4%	-4%	-5%	-4%	-4%	
	Node 8	27%	23%	22%	27%	22%	22%	
	Node 9	25%	21%	21%	25%	21%	21%	

### Zero-Seq. Short-Circuit Current Contributions



a. Station-A zero-seq. short-circuit current contributions

b. MPT's 115-kV side zero-seq. short-circuit current contributions

#### Short-circuit contributions for various MPT NGR sizes

- Zero-seq. current contributions (I<sub>0</sub>) from Station-A and MPT's 115 kV terminal were measured for varying NGR sizes (including when the NGR was bypassed)
- Zero-seq. currents varied between the considered ISO Base Cases



### Zero-Seq. Short-Circuit Current Contributions (Cont'd.)

- In ISO 2019 Base Case, with and without project connected and MPT's 115 kV side grounded, Station-A's contributions were 210 A and 111 A, respectively—111 A is less than twice the relay pickup value
- In ISO 2019 Base Case, with the project connected and MPT's 115 kV side grounded with NGR and only when NGR = 50 p.u., Station-A's  $I_0$  reached above twice the relay R-A pickup value
- In ISO 2022 and 2027 Base Cases with the project connected and MPT's 115 kV Y-side grounded, Station-A's contributions were close to or above the twice the relay R-A pickup value—needing minimum NGR size or no NGR for a proper relay R-A operation:
  - MPT's zero-seq. contributions within acceptable ranges for various NGR sizes
  - With project connected and MPT's 115 kV Y-side ungrounded, Station-A's contributions exceeded threshold values, remaining consistent across base cases



### **Ground Distance Relay-Related Impedances**





a. Line-AB apparent impedances, as seen by R-A relay, for a SLG fault at Station-B

b. Line-AB apparent impedances, as seen by R-B relay, for a SLG fault at Station-A

Apparent impedances measured by the line-end ground distance relays for the considered SLG faults

- Study conducted for ISO's 2019, 2022, and 2027 Base Cases, analyzing the ground distance relays R-A and R-B impedances for SLG faults at Station-B and Station-A, respectively
- Relay R-A and R-B apparent impedances vary conditions of project connection or not and MPT grounding scenarios if the project is connected



### Ground Distance Relay-Related Impedances (Cont'd.)





a. Line-AB apparent impedances, as seen by R-A relay, for a SLG fault at Station-B

b. Line-AB apparent impedances, as seen by R-B relay, for a SLG fault at Station-A

## Apparent impedances measured by the line-end ground distance relays for the considered SLG faults

- Operating the project with MPT's 115 kV Y-side ungrounded results in no significant impedance changes: see red (without project) and blue (with project) dots
- Project connection to ISO's system alters apparent impedances seen by ground distance relays (red and green dots in Figure 3), necessitating review of relay settings

### Ground Distance Relay-Related Impedances (Cont'd.)

ISO Baso Caso	SLG Fault Location	MPT Grounding		Sequence Voltag	ges	Line-to-Gnd. Voltages			
ISO Dase Case			Pos. Seq.	(kV) Neg. Seq. (kV)	)Zero Seq. (kV)	Phase-A (%)	Phase-B (%)	Phase-C (%)	
2019 -	Station-A	Ungrounded	54.3	10.9	30.6	19%	117%	115%	
		NGR=50 p.u.	53.8	11.4	27.6	22%	114%	111%	
	Station-B	Ungrounded	56.9	8.3	9.0	60%	100%	98%	
		NGR=50 p.u.	56.9	8.3	7.8	62%	99%	97%	
2022 -	Station-A	Ungrounded	56.5	10.1	33.8	19%	<b>121%</b>	123%	
	Station-B	Ungrounded	59.0	7.5	10.7	62%	103%	102%	
2027 —	Station-B	Ungrounded	56.0	10.7	33.7	18%	<b>121%</b>	122%	
		NGR=1 p.u.	54.9	11.8	26.7	25%	114%	112%	
	Station-B	Ungrounded	58.9	7.7	10.6	61%	103%	102%	
		NGR=1 p.u.	58.9	7.7	7.6	66%	101%	99%	

#### Post-project: MPT'S 115 kV Y-side during-fault voltages

- SLG faults at Station-A with ungrounded MPT or selected NGRs lead to line-to-ground voltages exceeding equipment tolerances, requiring protection with R-Prj relay's phase overvoltage element (59)
- Voltages at 115 kV side of MPT within typical relay pickup settings for negative-sequence and zerosequence voltages under selected operating scenarios



# Negative-Seq. Short-Circuit Current Contributions

- IBRs do not typically or do not consistently contribute
  negative-sequence currents during external unbalanced faults
- Evaluation of negative-sequence short-circuit current contributions considered various slopes of negative-sequence dynamic reactive current (*k* values 2–6)
- Simulated site MPT's 115 kV positive- and negative-sequence short-circuit currents for different solar inverter k values and SLG faults at Station-B



### Neg.-Seq. Short-Circuit Current Contributions (Cont'd.)

ISO Base Cases	Pos. Seq. Currents (A)					Neg. Seq. Currents (A)					
	<i>k</i> =2	<i>k</i> =3	<i>k</i> =4	<i>k</i> =5	<i>k</i> =6	<i>k</i> =2	<i>k</i> =3	<i>k</i> =4	<i>k</i> =5	<i>k</i> =6	
2019	37.3	49.9	53.6	-	-	20.7	27.3	25.5	-	-	
2022	38.5	52.2	63.3	65.0	75.3	20.2	26.7	32.7	27.4	67.1	
2027	37.2	50.5	71.0	-	-	18.1	25.6	37.8	-	-	

#### Post-project: MPT'S 115 kV short-circuit contributions

- Results show that higher *k* values lead to higher inverter negative-sequence short-circuit current contributions and higher terminal voltages.
- In cases where inverter terminal voltages exceeded 1.1 p.u., inverters shutdown, resulting in no shortcircuit contributions
- The choice of *k* value should be determined during project design or as part of the ISO's SIS
- Simulated negative-sequence short-circuit current contributions were within typical relay pickup setting ranges



### **Potential Mitigation Options**

Option-1: Consideration of ungrounded operation with voltage element detection:

- Operate the site's MPT's 115 kV Y-side as ungrounded
- Use ground fault detection using the site relay's voltage elements as secondary protection
- Implement the utility's signal-based DTT primary protection
- The existing ground distance relay settings at Station-A may remain suitable since the apparent impedance seen by the ground distance relay won't change significantly

Option-2: Solidly or impedance grounding with current element detection:

- Ground the site MPT's 115 kV Y-side solidly or with impedance grounding
- Utilize ground fault detection using the site relay's current elements as secondary protection
- Implement the utility's signal-based DTT primary protection
- Review and potentially redefine Station-A ground distance relay settings, considering apparent impedance changes due to the site's connection

### **Potential Mitigation Options (Cont'd.)**

Option-3: Utilization of negative-seq. protection for projects with negative-seq. current injection:

- For projects with significant negative-sequence current injection capability, utilize the site MPT's 115 kV Y-side negative-sequence protection elements.
- Determine a suitable k value for the project in advance



### Key Takeaways

- Presented options underscore the importance of considering various factors such as project equipment, system setup, protection philosophies of host utilities, and operational criteria and constraints of the ISO's system
- The choice of mitigation strategy would depend on the specific characteristics and requirements of the project, as well as the broader system considerations outlined above
- Standardization and consistent application of negative-seq. current requirements from IBRs for ground fault detection and protection is necessary for broader adoption of IBRs



# Questions?





Unrestricted | © Siemens 2024 | Sarat Chandra Vegunta | SI GSW PTI US&MX | 2024-03-25

#### **Disclaimer**

© Siemens 2024

Subject to changes and errors. The information given in this document only contains general descriptions and/or performance features which may not always specifically reflect those described, or which may undergo modification in the course of further development of the products. The requested performance features are binding only when they are expressly agreed upon in the concluded contract.

All product designations may be trademarks or other rights of Siemens AG, its affiliated companies or other companies whose use by third parties for their own purposes could violate the rights of the respective owner.





#### Published by Siemens PTI

#### Sarat Chandra Vegunta

Consulting Director SI GSW PTI US & MX Siemens Industry, Inc. 400 State St, 4<sup>th</sup> Floor Schenectady, NY 12305, USA

#### Mobile +1 (773) 431-0735

E-mail Chandra.Vegunta@siemens.com



